ANGER AND THE IMMOBILIZATION OF INSTITUTIONAL INSIDERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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Abstract

We theorize that anger incited by a social movement might immobilize collective action intentions for institutional insiders (i.e., those sympathetic to a movement and employed by a social movement’s target) unlike anger’s mobilizing effect among outsider activists. Initial field surveys across a spectrum of social movements, including during Occupy Wall Street, business sustainability, #metoo, and gun control, showed that institutional insiders are often just as angry as outsider activists. However, the evidence questioned whether social movement anger translated into collective action intentions among institutional insiders. We tested our theory deductively with an experiment, conducted with participants who were supportive of social movement issues in their organizations. Our results show that anger about a social movement issue relates to greater collective action intentions for outsider activists, but not among institutional insiders. Instead of anger emboldening institutional insiders to act despite the potential costs, anger triggers greater fear about the potential negative consequences of collective action in the workplace, which in turn results in withdrawal. While social movements often rely on anger frames to mobilize sympathizers, our work suggests that this practice may paradoxically unravel the motivation of those uniquely positioned to be able to influence organizations to change.
An important topic of scholarship in social movements and organizational literature has been examining why activists mobilize to participate in collective action (e.g., Klandermans and Oegema, 1987; Walker, Martin and McCarthy, 2008; Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; King and Pearce, 2010; Giorgi, Bartunek, and King, 2017). Research shows that antecedents of mobilization include biographical availability (e.g., McAdam, 1986; DiGrazia, 2014), rational considerations such as political efficacy and group thresholds (e.g., Oliver, 1993; Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 1997; Klandermans et al., 2008), and structural proximity to resources (e.g., McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Munson, 2010; see Schussman and Soule, 2005). Although social movement scholars have emphasized the structural conditions that facilitate mobilization (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1996), increasingly, researchers recognize that collective action can also be triggered by emotional stimuli (e.g., Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2000, 2001; Berezin, 2002; Jasper, 2011)\(^1\), including the strategic framing of social movement organizations (Benford and Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992). While emotions may be associated with other antecedents of collective action, scholars postulate that emotions are proximate causes of individual mobilization (Mackie et al., 2000; Goodwin, et al., 2001; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Klandermans et al., 2008; Jasper, 2011; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk, 2011).

Historically, research on social movements, including that on mobilizing emotions, has been on activists located outside of the target organization, such as social movement organization members (e.g., Goodwin et al., 2001). More recently, management scholars are increasingly studying “institutional insiders” (Meyerson, 2001; Scully and Segal, 2002; Sonenshein, DeCelles and Dutton, 2014; Davis and White, 2015; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), defined as social

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movement sympathizers who occupy positions within the targeted institutions (Epstein, 1996; Binder, 2002; Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; Kellogg, 2009; Vasi and King, 2012; McDonnell, King and Soule, 2015; Eesley, DeCelles and Lenox, 2016). Researchers have highlighted several ways in which institutional insiders differ from outsiders due to their structural location (see Briscoe and Gupta, 2016 for a review), such as knowledge about the organizational target and access to key resources. These differences give insiders an advantage in assisting their movement allies to bring about organizational change. And yet, numerous scholars have noted the difficulty in mobilizing insiders to take collective action (e.g., Martin, 1986; Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Kellogg, 2009; Giorgi et al., 2018). Why do sympathetic insiders often fail to mobilize and push for organizational change?

We posit that one reason insiders fail to mobilize is their asymmetric reactions to the emotional stimuli of social movements. Researchers recognize that institutional insiders’ emotional reactions to movements may differ from those of outsiders (e.g., Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Meyerson, 2001; Taylor and Raeburn, 1995). Such emotional asymmetries of institutional insiders and outsiders might differentially influence their social movement mobilization.

We focus our investigation on the potential emotional asymmetries of institutional insiders and outsider activists on one of the most commonly incited emotions evident in social movement scholarship: anger. Although a great deal of evidence shows that activists are more likely to mobilize when experiencing anger at injustices (Collins, 1990; Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001; Aminzade and McAdam, 2002; Emibayer and Goldberg, 2005), this research also has traditionally focused on the anger of activists who are not employed by target organizations.

2 We note the similarity between institutional insiders and “institutional activists” (Santoro and McGuire 1997), although the latter refers to insiders within the government who are already mobilized to engage in collective action on behalf of a movement.
However, institutional insiders are more likely to believe that their anger about social causes needs to be “tempered” in the workplace (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Meyerson, 2001), suggesting it might not be a mobilizing emotion for them. Our theoretical account goes beyond this recognition by seeking to explain why anger may actually demobilize insiders.

Organizational scholarship on social movements, which is dominated by sociological and non-market strategy approaches (cf. Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), understandably focuses on the macro-level antecedents of collective action. As a result, the literature often overlooks individual factors, such as psychological and emotional processes, which vary within the same institutional and structural conditions (Coleman, 1994). Moreover, social movement research, despite pointing to the importance of institutional insiders to the success of movements in affecting change, has not examined the micro-dynamics of mobilizing insiders and how those might differ from mobilizing outsider activists (Pettinnichio, 2012; Olzak et al., 2016). The most proximal antecedent to individuals’ action is likely to be their psychological response. Therefore, a psychological account of individual motivation can inform traditional sociological and organizational theory perspectives on the role of emotion in social movement mobilization. For example, research on employees’ perceived injustice, a perception closely associated with anger (Lazarus, 1991; Jasper, 2011), shows that their angry motivations can be quelled by individuals’ group memberships (Friedman and Robinson, 1993; Davidson and Friedman, 1998). These results imply that the effect of anger on individuals’ mobilization may change depending on their social contextual factors. Incorporating psychological theory on motivation and emotion can therefore provide valuable insight into the individual level mobilization process, and perhaps challenge a dominant theme in the literature about the motivating effects of activists’ anger in social movements.
Specifically, we theorize that while anger motivates outsider activists to engage in collective action, institutional insiders’ anger about a social movement issue heightens their conflicting interests as an advocate for a social movement and a loyal employee (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Meyerson, 2001). Reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray, 1976, 1982, Gray and McNaughton, 2000), a theory explaining the psychology of individual motivation, stipulates that when individuals experience goal conflict, they will attend more to potential risks in their environment. As a result of attending more to the potential risks of acting, individuals experience greater fear, and consequently withdraw from goal-related action (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). Institutional insiders indeed face risks for advocating for a social movement issue at work, such as damage to their reputation or career (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Meyerson and Scully, 1995). Therefore, it might be the case that when institutional insiders experience anger about injustices in their organization, these potential consequences loom larger, activating fear and undermining their motivation for collective action.

Social movement organizations and scholars alike believe that anger is a strongly motivating force that encourages activists to act and may even help to overcome their fears (Britt and Heise, 2000). However, we argue that this is not the case for institutional insiders. Instead, we posit that insiders’ anger about a social movement issue may produce an even greater sense of fear for taking action, resulting in withdrawal from – rather than a propulsion towards – collective action. This point is particularly important because social movement activists may deliberately use the emotional stimulus of anger to encourage action (Jasper et al., 2009), such as with the use of frames (Snow and Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1992; Klandermans et al., 1999). Our perspective suggests that this may, paradoxically, undermine the very mobilization process it seeks to create by fostering an overwhelming fear among sympathetic individuals nested within
the target organization. And, while institutional insiders are arguably well positioned to be able to make change in a target organization, we suggest that the common social movement strategy to incite indignation among sympathizers undercuts this opportunity.

**Theorizing Emotions and Mobilization**

Within the vast literature on social movement mobilization (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Zurcher and Snow, 1981; Klandermans, 1984), scholars historically emphasized the structural conditions that facilitate large-scale mobilization (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam 1996). Sociologists have come to recognize that emotion, whether manifest at the collective or individual level, is a crucial ingredient of collective action (Durkheim, 1912; Blumer, 1939; Gamson, 1992; Thompson and Fine, 1999; Goodwin et al., 2000; Jasper, 2011). Social movement organizations use emotional stimuli, often initiated through strategic framing, as a motivation for individual participation in collective action (e.g., Benford and Snow, 2000; Berezin, 2002; Klandermans et al., 2008; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2000).³

Research has moved beyond the early distinctions made by sociologists who believed that emotion was a disruptive ingredient to institutional norms that irrationally provoked crowd and collective behavior (e.g., LeBon, 1895; Blumer, 1939; Kornhauser, 1959). In his review of recent research on emotions and movements, Jasper (2011: 286) summarized the growing consensus that “[e]motions are present in every phase and every aspect of protest.” As Collins (2004) and others have postulated, “emotional energy” is a basic ingredient of group behavior that links individuals to the communities of action that underlie movements’ tactics, goals, and means of

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³ We note that there is a distinction between the structural conditions that facilitate collective action at the group level versus characteristics or experiential factors that trigger individuals’ participation in collective action. By narrowing our analytic focus to individuals’ experience of anger, our study is situated in the latter stream of research.
expression (Summers-Effler, 2010). When invoked by movements’ rituals, frames, or actions, anger, joy, solidarity, and thrill can all serve to bind individuals to the movement and give those individuals an outlet for self-realization (Durkheim, 1912; Collins, 1990; Yang, 2000).

Although a variety of emotions affect mobilization (e.g., Jasper (2011) reviews several), we focus our inquiry on anger – an emotion that has an especially important place in social movement scholarship. Scholars recognize that anger is a common mobilizing emotion that prompts people to threaten, harm and publicly criticize institutions, stand up against moral wrongs, fight against injustice, and act out in response to perceived social ills (Folger, 1987; Lazarus, 1991; Jasper and Poulsen, 1995). Indeed, social movements often arise from “righteous indignation” (Stein, 1975: 283; Cadena-Roa, 2002) and group-based anger (Thoits, 1990; Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2011; Rao and Dutta, 2012). Anger associated with oppositional and adversarial frames in social movements induces fights against injustices and threats (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans et al., 1999). Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) argue that group-based anger is a dual motivation, along with instrumental considerations, of collective action, while Van Stekelenburg and colleagues (2011) show that anger, more than other emotions, amplifies participation in social movements.

Anger is also one of the most salient emotions in social movements and is one that is often aligned with other ideological triggers of individual intentions to engage in collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2011). Yang (2000) highlights anger in the Chinese student movement expressed in their protests in reaction to police brutality and the government’s repression. Students in the movement believed that their involvement in the movement was a public demonstration of their feelings of outrage toward the government.
Research on the feminist movement demonstrates that women’s organizations purposefully sought to transform women’s experiences of oppression into anger (Taylor, 1996; Hercus, 1999). Britt and Heise (2000) further show that the gay liberation movement helped mobilize gay men, who had previously been seen as deviant by much of society, by transforming feelings of shame into anger. Gamson (1992) argued that anger is a natural emotional response to claims of injustice and inequality, writing, “Different emotions can be stimulated by perceived inequities – cynicism, bemused irony, resignation. But injustice focuses on the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (1992: 31). Movements that focus on rectifying injustices, then, may purposefully ignite feelings of anger in individuals, energizing individuals sympathetic to social movements and helping them overcome obstacles to mobilization (Collins, 1990).

In addition to anger, we also examine the consequences of another negative emotion common in social movements scholarship (e.g., Britt and Heise, 2000; Neubert, 1998), fear, which we position as a critical factor explaining why institutional insiders’ anger might not be effectively translated into collective action intentions. Employees’ fear of potential negative consequences for advocacy can dampen their willingness to advocate for social issues at work (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes, and Wierba, 1997; Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, and Dutton, 1998; Dutton, Ashford, Lawrence and Miner-Rubino, 2002), to speak up about issues in their workplace that concern them (Milliken, Morrison and Hewlin, 2003), and to voice their opinion at work more generally (Morrison, 2011; Detert and Burris, 2007). Social movement research also considers fear as a primary reflex emotion experienced by sympathizers (Jasper, 2011), and one that is experienced when individuals are in a hierarchy and realize there is an insufficiency in one’s own power (Kemper, 2006). Social movements scholars recognize that, without fear, social movements might “undertake reckless and self-defeating actions” (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta,
and have found that fear and anger are the most frequently mentioned emotions in oral histories of social movements (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001). Furthermore, scholars acknowledge that fear can suppress protest and collective action (Barbalet, 1998; Britt and Heise, 2000; Miller et al., 2009) and therefore, must be overcome to mobilize collective action (Neubert, 1998). Yet, this process often happens when individuals engage with a group of similarly-positioned actors (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001), a social group which institutional insiders are less likely to have than outsider activists. Therefore, institutional insiders’ fear – and in particular, fear of negative consequences for collective action at work - is likely a critical factor for mobilizing institutional insiders. However, past research, while recognizing that fear can suppress collective action motivation, and that fear and anger can co-occur in social movements (e.g., Miller et al., 2009), has not considered the paradoxical relationship that we theorize: that fear could increase because of anger, which in turn reduces collective action mobilization among institutional insiders.

**Hypotheses**

We examine the mobilization process of social movement sympathizers by focusing specifically on individuals’ collective action intentions. Collective action intentions precede action and are individual-level inclination “to engage in action, or support for different forms of action” in backing a social movement (cf. Tausch, et al. 2011: 132). Research shows that not only are collective action intentions reasonable proxies for individuals’ actual behavior, which can be challenging to measure (Webb and Sheeran, 2006), but also collective action intentions are significant predictors of real participation in a social movement (De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009, cf. Tausch, et al., 2011). Collective action intentions also need not refer only to group actions; rather, we use the term to imply that individuals intend
to engage in behaviors in support of a greater social movement (see Crosby 1976; Martin et al. 1984; Martin, 1986), which can include trying to solicit others’ support in the movement (Kellogg, 2012).

To develop our hypotheses about the mobilization of angry institutional insiders (versus outsiders), we turn to psychological theory about motivational processes that explain how emotional factors shape individuals’ motivation. First, we draw from reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray, 1970, 1987; Carver and White, 1994), which posits that humans have three interrelated psychological systems that regulate motivation and behavior, including the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), the behavioral approach system (BAS), and the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) (Gray, 1976, 1982, Gray and McNaughton, 2000).

One important recent advance within this body of work is that the BIS system is activated only when there is an approach-avoidance goal conflict (BAS regulates purely approach-related goals and FFFS regulates behavior when facing a purely aversive stimulus; Gray and McNaughton, 2000, Corr, 2002; Berkman, Lieberman and Gable, 2009). Approach-avoidance goal conflicts are circumstances that, in order for an individual to achieve a desire or goal, it requires him or her to approach or somehow move towards a source of danger (Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Lewin, 1935). Under such circumstances, individuals are biased towards a BIS-guided behavioral response. That is, individuals are more likely to take action to reduce goal conflict by engaging in avoidance or withdrawal behavior because the activation of BIS prompts greater attention to potential threats, increasing fear, anxiety, and inhibition (Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Corr, 2002; Berkman, Lieberman and Gable, 2009).

Applying this theory to the mobilization of institutional insiders and outsiders in social movements can help deepen understanding of the psychological mechanisms of collective action
motivation. Consistent with previous research reviewed above in social movements and emotion, we theorize that being angry about an issue sends an emotional signal to activists that there is an important injustice to attend to, and one that they consider acting upon due to the approach or “action” oriented properties of anger (Frijda, Kuipers and ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991). However, for institutional insiders, the feeling of anger is likely to highlight an approach-avoidance goal conflict (Lewin, 1935). As sympathizers to a social movement, institutional insiders have an approach goal of wanting to improve an organization’s response to a social movement. Yet, as an organizational member, promoting change typically involves advocating to others, including powerful authorities who are a potential source of punishment or career harm, and coworkers who could damage a person’s reputation (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Meyerson and Scully, 1995). Due to their dependence on the target organization, institutional insiders are arguably more likely to fear negative consequences at work for acting than are outsiders (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). Decision makers inside organizations are likely to discourage or even punish actions that threaten or challenge authority (Kellogg, 2012; Soule, 2012), including advocating for social movement issues (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes, and Wierba, 1997; Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, and Dutton, 1998; Dutton, Ashford, Lawrence and Miner-Rubino, 2002). As a result, trying to support social movements at work could jeopardize institutional insiders’ careers or reputations (Ashford 1986; Meyerson and Scully, 1995).

Such institutional insiders’ goal conflict, highlighted by their experience of anger, may trigger the BIS system and therefore result in a withdrawal response. That is, institutional insiders will withdraw from participating in collective action because doing so is an approach-avoid goal conflict. This point is in contrast to outsiders, who do not have such goal conflict, and therefore outsiders are likely to only experience an “approach” goal that is activated when
feeling anger incited by the social movement. As a result, institutional insiders experiencing anger incited by a movement may have fewer intentions to participate in collective action.

**Hypothesis 1.** While outsiders’ anger incited by a movement is positively related to their collective action intentions, institutional insiders’ incited by a movement is negatively related to their collective action intentions.

The behavioral inhibition system, when activated, means that individuals more readily attend to sources of potential danger, risks, and threats in their environment (Gray, 1970, 1987). We theorize that this will manifest through angry institutional insiders’ seeing greater potential for damage to their careers and reputations for advocating for a social issue at work (Ashford 1986; Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Meyerson and Scully 1995; Meyerson, 2001). Because institutional insiders are keenly aware of the risks of advocating for a social issue at work, if the BIS is activated via anger, institutional insiders will be more likely to experience fear of the negative consequences associated with these risks.

Past research has shown that fear suppresses anger as a motivator of collective action (Miller et al., 2009), and that when fearing punishment, employees of a target institution may feel a lack of sufficient power to resolve issues (Kemper, 1978). The behavioral tendencies of individuals experiencing fear is avoidance and withdrawal from the source of the fear as a functional, adaptive response (Frijda, 1989). Therefore, the experience of fear should relate to fewer action intentions, and we expect that institutional insiders’ fear of negative consequences at work will mediate the negative relationship between anger and collective action intentions. Our logic is also consistent with appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1999), which posits that individuals cognitively re-appraise their emotional state which can change their emotional experience and resulting actions. From this perspective, when individuals experience the physiological arousal of anger, they proceed to appraise the situation believed to trigger this
feeling. If the context is believed to be punitive towards the expression of anger, the physiological cues of anger—high arousal, negative emotion—could instead be interpreted as fear (Allen, Kenrick, Linder and McCall, 1989; Robinson et al., 2006). Sociological perspectives building on affect control theory also suggest a similar, readily transformable relationship among high arousal emotions like anger and fear (Britt and Heise, 2000; Heise, 1979, 2007; Lively and Heise, 2004), and further specify that the affective meaning of a situation is subject to institutional roles and appropriate role behavior. That is, institutional insiders in an organization may reinterpret, deflect, and relabel their anger as fear, the latter being less likely to motivate action. Therefore, we propose:

**Hypothesis 2.** The negative relationship between institutional insiders’ anger incited by a movement and their collective action intentions is mediated by fear of negative consequences for engaging in collective action.

**Research Overview**

We examine how anger interacts with structural location (i.e., institutional insider versus outsider) to shape individuals’ collective action intentions across four studies. First, we completed exploratory work with institutional insiders and outsiders during the social movement Occupy Wall Street (OWS). Because OWS was a short-lived and an unusual movement, and our sample size was limited, in studies two and three, we present additional initial field surveys from larger samples of institutional insiders and outsiders across a range of contemporary social movements, and also examine evidence of the mechanism of fear of negative consequences among institutional insiders. In the final study, we use experimental methods to deductively test the hypotheses, to test for causality, causal direction, and to reduce concerns about potential third variables and selection problems inherent in correlational designs. Additional studies, details, materials, pre-registrations and replications can be found in our open science framework folder.
for this project at https://osf.io/3cz28/

STUDY 1

We conducted an initial field study during the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 to examine the role of anger among institutional insiders versus outsiders. We collected data from separate populations of outsider and institutional insiders during the Occupy Wall Street movement. OWS protestors (outsiders) camped in a park near Wall Street for several months to rally against inequality, until they were evicted by police. The OWS protests also created controversy on Wall Street—some mocked the protestors, while it sparked doubts among other Wall Street employees, who began questioning whether they wanted to stay in a finance career (Fox, 2014).

Consider the role that anger played in facilitating mobilization among OWS supporters. In the OWS encampments that formed in 2011, anger was often invoked by the slogans and posters used by outsiders. Tarrow (2011) described OWS as a “constituent moment,” or a gathering of people across social class and demographic divides in an attempt to articulate a particular mood and opposition to a system (Frank, 2009). Although anger was not the only driver, nor the only emotion, of participation in the movement (Hammond, 2015; Vasi and Suh, 2016; Romanos, 2016), OWS provoked a particular form of anger about the injustices created by capitalism. Such anger permeated the media coverage of OWS and was prominent in the collective action frames used by OWS both in the camps and on social media. Consider a typical tweet by OWS supporters at that time: “We are fighting for the 99% that have been left behind. #OWS #anger” (Mohammad, 2012). Messages such as these were not only meant to convey the anger felt by participants in OWS but also as a rallying cry to bystanders who might be drawn

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4 In an ethnography of OWS, Sitrin (2013) described the feeling of participating: “Anger, hate, and frustration are all a part of the movements and what we are rejecting and feeling every day.”
into the movement. Although scholars have questioned whether OWS had the organizational backbone to sustain a long-term campaign, they recognized that OWS’s emotional resonance had a large impact on its ability to recruit vocal participants (Gamson and Sifry, 2013). As Langham (2013: 520) writes, “Occupy became the means of channeling legitimate anger toward productive ends, the progressive transformation of society.”

Based on this reasoning, OWS represents an extreme type of an expressive social movement, which is a social movement meant to mobilize people around a particular emotion (Melucci, 1985). In the case of OWS, the emotion was not directed at a specific organization or policy, but rather at an entire institution: capitalism. Individuals or organizations that were seen as critical to the functioning of capitalism were symbolic targets. The theme of one OWS website encapsulates this anger well: “We Kick the Ass of the Ruling Class.”5 The wealthiest individuals – or the 1% - were regularly lambasted, as were financial institutions which were seen as symbols of this wealth. As representations of what was wrong with capitalism, wealthy individuals and banks were frequently isolated in the angry imagery of the protestors. Notably, we do not mean to imply that other emotions were not experienced or important during OWS, but to establish why anger was a relevant emotion for this movement, and therefore, a suitable setting for our first study.

Participants

To access outsiders, the first author and a research assistant visited the original and central location for the movement, Zuccotti Park in New York City, to solicit participants to complete hard-copy survey. Researchers approached protestors and asked if they would be willing to take a 15-minute survey on emotions and social change related to OWS. We approached protestors at

5 http://occupywallst.org/
all times of the day, and on both weekends and weekdays over the four-day period. We asked participants if they currently (0) worked on Wall Street to ensure they were not institutional insiders. A few (6) protestors refused, but overall 160 outsider responses were obtained.

To access OWS institutional insiders, one researcher visited lunchtime and happy-hour locations near the New York Stock Exchange and asked individuals if they worked in the finance industry and would be willing to take a 15-minute survey on emotions and social change related to OWS. Additionally, a researcher accessed the New York Stock Exchange trading floor to distribute surveys. These recruitment methods resulted in 41 surveys, but only nine of which were from institutional insiders (i.e., were at least somewhat supportive of the goals of OWS). To increase our sample of institutional insiders, we employed a market research company (Qualtrics) to target New York finance industry professionals who were supportive of OWS, using their representative online panel, on the same days that in-person data collection occurred. It was important to collect data from institutional insiders and outsiders at the same time because unfolding events could exogenously trigger an emotional response.

Our institutional insider recruitment methods resulted in a wider distribution of individuals than only institutional insiders. Therefore, we used two questions to screen participants to better match our target sample both for our in-person and online recruitment. We asked participants “to what extent do you want the banking/finance industry to change?” and “to what extent do you support the goals of Occupy Wall Street?” (rated on a scale from 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). We included only those who scored at or above the midpoint on the scale (4) for both of these questions. Using newspaper estimates of the percentage of New Yorkers supportive of OWS (see Reuters, 2011), we instructed Qualtrics to obtain a sample of 100 qualified participants. Of the 826 individuals contacted by the market research panel who
were believed to be professionals in the financial industry living in the New York area, 94 agreed to participate, were currently working in the finance industry in New York, and were supportive of OWS. Therefore, adding the 9 in-person surveys, our final institutional insider sample was 103, although there were data missing across each of the measures. Our pattern of results is identical when including or excluding the in-person surveys.

**Sample Representativeness**

We examined the representativeness of the samples by comparing them to known demographics. The panel we used from Qualtrics maintains that they have a representative sample of respondents in the finance industry. However, because we also screened by supportiveness of OWS, the sample is not a precisely representative. We also compared our sample demographics to other estimates for Wall Street employees’ salaries. For institutional insiders, these estimates range from $100,000 to $1 million, with the median salary in 2005-2009 estimated at $155,000 (Alden 2011). We observed a slightly higher salary average ($229,824) in those who answered this question in our sample \(N=51\). Seven individuals reported values less than $50,000, explained by the fact that they were part-time employees, interns, or in administrative positions; in addition, five respondents indicated greater than $1M in income, possibly NYSE traders. Of the respondents that answered the gender question \(N = 53\), 69.8% were male, which was fairly consistent with other estimates regarding demographics in the finance industry (72.5 % male; Alba and Pereira 2011, Center for Urban Research). Of those who reported their ethnicity \(N = 53\), our sample was less diverse than other estimates of the percent non-Whites working in this field (30.2% non-white in our sample versus 45.6% estimated by the Center for Urban Research). Finally, the Center for Urban research also estimated that approximately 86 percent of
Wall Street workers earned at least a bachelor’s degree in education, which was consistent with our sample (82.6%).

In order to evaluate whether our sample of outsiders was comparable with the larger population of OWS participants, we compared our sample demographics with an online survey conducted by OWS members. This online survey of 1,619 protestors was conducted by OWS in collaboration with an academic researcher (Cordero-Guzman, 2011) and the results are posted on the movement’s website (occupywallst.org). Of those who answered our demographic questions, our sample was largely comparable with the other study, but was slightly younger, more frequently male, and earned slightly less income. This discrepancy is understandable given that our sample contained respondents occupying the park and for whom it would be easier to take a survey than for those protestors who are employed, older, and were not students. In terms of age, our sample was 74.8 percent under the age of 34, whereas their sample was 64.2 percent under the age of 34. Our sample had a fairly similar gender breakdown as this online survey (64.6 percent male versus 67 percent male, respectively). Of our sample who reported their ethnicity (N= 149), our sample was less diverse, being mostly white (79.9 percent), compared with 67.6 percent in the online study. Regarding income, 89.6 percent of our respondents earned $50,000 or less annually, whereas 71.5 percent of the online study sample reported making less than $50,000.

Measures

A copy of our survey with all measures can be found in our OSF folder for this project. Of particular interest to our focus here, we first measured individuals’ social movement anger by asking all participants to rate to what degree (from 1= not at all to 5= extremely) they felt aggravated, upset, angry, irritable, and frustrated since the beginning of OWS, consistent with
extant measures of anger (Harmon-Jones and Sigelman, 2001; Lerner and Keltner, 2001). Reliability of the five-item scale was .89 for the outsiders sample and .96 for the institutional insider sample.

We measured participants’ collective action intentions by coding their responses to the open question “Please explain what you plan to do to support the goals of Occupy Wall St.” Participants listed various actions, such as continuing to occupy the park, working in the camp (e.g., in the kitchen), engaging in marches and protests in New York, and visiting other OWS camps around the U.S. Two trained research assistants who were blind to the study’s purpose independently coded the number of discrete actions from participants’ written responses to the question. Coders’ initial agreement ranged from $r= .84$ to .95 and were averaged to form the measure. These codes constituted a measure of action intentions (ranging from 0 to 7).

We controlled for the possibility that individuals’ previous participation in collective action could have either generated or changed individuals’ anger because engaging in collective action can cause different emotions, including anger (Becker, Tausch, and Wagner, 2011). We asked all participants what activities (if any) they had been involved in to help support OWS, which we then used to create a score for each participant. Participants received a 1 for each of the 9 behaviors indicated on the survey, such as volunteered time, donated money, participated in rallies/protests, etc. Based on written comments in response to the “other” item, as well as to the following open question, “Please describe your involvement in Occupy Wall Street.” We also coded the number of additional actions not captured by the discrete items, such as whether individuals slept at the occupied park, participated in OWS working groups such as the library, media or sanitation, made signs, etc. We used the same coding procedure that we followed for coding action intentions from participants’ written comments. Coders’ initial agreement ranged
from $r = .68$ to $.77$, and disagreements were resolved with discussion. We then transformed this into a scale measure for past actions by adding items from the survey to the coded actions, which ranged from 0 to 11.

**Results and Discussion**

Sample descriptives, bivariate correlations, and regression results appear in Tables 1-4.

[Insert Tables 1-4 here]

From the raw correlations, one can see that angrier institutional insiders reported significantly fewer future collective actions ($r = -.35, p = .001$); however, among the outsiders, there was a small positive ($r = .05$) but insignificant raw correlation between anger and reported collective action intentions. Results of OLS regressions (see Model 1 in Tables 2 and 4) were consistent with the correlations and indicated that institutional insiders who were angrier were less likely to report intentions for taking collective action $B = -.13, SE = .04, p = .001$). By contrast, the relationship between anger and action intentions for outsiders was positive but not significant ($B = .06, SE = .10, p = .524$).

Given the cross-sectional nature of the work, covariates are also necessary to reduce potential confounds between these two groups. We were especially concerned about how individuals’ previous actions may have affected the relationship between anger and action intentions due to research showing that collective action participation can trigger individuals’ anger (Becker, Tausch and Wagner, 2011) and therefore could be an alternative explanation or a suppressor in the data. Particularly in a cross-sectional study and one in which we did not isolate the measure of anger to be more specific about where it was directed at, it was important to control for the amount of past actions as this possible third variable. We also included demographic variables that could potentially explain differences we observed between insiders
versus outsiders, and could be of interest to sociologists, including gender, age, income, education, ethnicity, political orientation, and whether or not the individual was a member of a social movement organization.

Because our anger measure in this study was arguably more general (it measured emotions experienced during the past two weeks since OWS began), it could be the case that institutional insiders were angry because the protestors had angered them, thereby reducing their collective action intentions. We therefore included a covariate measure of anger directed at protestors for the institutional insiders (to what extent they felt frustration, hostility, irritation, and anger towards the protestors, $\alpha = .95$). However, it should be noted that members of both of our samples contained missing data on these predictors, which reduced the $N$ substantially in these regression models. Results of these OLS regressions (Model 2 in Tables 2 and 4) were weaker, likely due to reduced statistical power. Including these covariates in the equation showed that institutional insiders who were angrier were marginally less likely to report intentions for taking collective action ($B = -1.17, SE = .09, p = .062$). The relationship between anger and action intentions for outsiders was again positive but not significant ($B = .18, SE = .11, p = .120$). Using ordered logit and count regressions show similar results. This lack of significant positive relationship between anger and collective action intentions for outsiders could be due to the relatively small sample size, but it is also possible that anger was a less motivating emotion for members of the OWS than is typical among outsider activists due to the context of the movement itself.

This initial study allowed us to examine the relationship between anger and collective action intentions among institutional insider and outsiders who were currently involved in a contemporary social movement. This study challenges an interdisciplinary body of research
showing that individuals’ anger mobilizes social movement collective action, and in particular, for institutional insiders among whom we found lower action intentions to the extent they experienced anger during OWS. However, it has limitations that we sought to address in our next study. First, this study was an initial exploratory examination of the relationships between anger and collective action intentions among institutional insiders and contained a rather small and possibly unique sample of participants. It could be, for example, that more established or different types of social movements have different emotional dynamics from OWS. Therefore, in our next studies, we examine these questions with larger, broader samples across more established social movements and organizational and institutional contexts. In addition, different groups could be experiencing anger based on different targets or sources (e.g., media, politicians, feeling constrained in being able to act) which could have influenced their action intentions differently. We cannot rule this possibility out in the current study and therefore, code for the source of individuals’ anger in later studies. Finally, as with any correlational study, reverse causality, third variables and selection problems can occur. Therefore, in Study 4 we use experimental methods to address these concerns.

**STUDY 2**

**Participants**

We sought approximately 300 outsiders who were part of contemporary, ongoing social movements to take part in a survey in December of 2017 by inviting individuals to complete an online survey for $3 compensation. We recruited these individuals using a panel of social movement activists maintained by scholars who are not part of the authorship team. These scholars maintain this panel by regularly conducting short, large-scale surveys of online panel participants in order to screen them for potential future studies unobtrusively. These surveys
include measures of demographics like age, race, gender, religion, languages, location, hobbies, education, occupation and employment, income and sexual orientation, and also measures for political orientation and identification, perceived social class, and interests and participation in activism. We emailed panel members who had replied “yes” to the question, “Would you consider yourself an activist (i.e., an active member of a social movement advocating for social change)? Please tell us what movement(s) you consider yourself an activist for.” We told panel members that, based on responses to previous surveys that they qualified for a new study, and we provided a link to our survey but did not disclose the topic of the study. We excluded those who participated more than once from analyses.

In their original survey, conducted on Mechanical Turk\(^6\), which is an online platform for survey based work, panelists reported a wide range of social movements and social issues, including environmentalism, gender issues, feminism, #metoo, LGTBQ rights, ethnic and racial diversity, Black Lives Matter, #grabyourwallet, animal rights, gun control, Net Neutrality, and many others. We received 251 responses, and 246 complete responses, with the most frequently reported social movements reported being Black Lives Matter (N=29) and #metoo (N=50).

Participants were 65.9% women, 74.4% White, 12.2% Black, 6.5% Latinx, 4.9% Asian, and averaged 35.55 years old (SD=11.51). For education, 57.7% of the participants had at least an undergraduate degree, and 58.5% reported employment outside of online survey work. In terms of political orientation, 56.6% reported being a Democrat and 8.4% were Republican, with

\(^6\) Recently, Mturk experienced problems with survey takers repeatedly taking surveys and using server farms to mask location (see https://blog.turkprime.com/after-the-bot-scare-understanding-whats-been-happening-with-data-collection-on-mturk-and-how-to-stop-it). All Mturk and other platform data in this paper were collected before these issues became a problem in 2018, and the risks of participants in our studies being bots or non-compliant survey takers is greatly reduced given that we required coherent, written responses.
5.2% reporting as Libertarian and 4.8% Green Party. No affiliation was reported by 25.1%, and 7.6% indicated “other” political affiliations.

**Procedure and Measures**

We adapted a protocol from prior work (Sonenshein, 2006), first presenting participants with a definition of a social issue (“By ‘social issue, we refer to a range of issues for organizations, including topics such as the environment and sustainability, human equality and diversity, and other issues often labeled “social responsibility.” These examples are not meant to be exhaustive, and there are many types of social issues that are relevant for organizations). We asked participants to think about a social issue that was important to them, and about which they felt strongly during the past three months. We asked them to identify what social issue, and what (if any) social movement they were thinking about, and asked how important it was to them.

Next, we measured participants’ anger in response to this social issue on a seven point scale (from 0= not at all to 8= a great deal). We asked them, “please indicate how much of each emotion you have felt on average on a daily basis when thinking about this social issue within the past three months,” and included the same five items measuring anger as Study 1 (α = .92).

We measured collective action intentions with two items. We asked participants how likely they are to engage in collective action in the future to advocate for this issue (such as try to influence others' opinions about it, participate in a protest or demonstration, sign a petition, etc.), and how likely they are to engage in collective action in the future for ANY issue; from 1= not at all likely to 7= extremely likely). We averaged these two items into a scale (α = .82).

We measured previous collective action by asking participants (from 1=none to 7= a great deal of effort): “How much effort would you estimate that you put into advocating for this issue in the past three months?” and “How much effort would you estimate that you put into
advocating for social issues OTHER than the one you have described during the past three months?” We averaged these items into a scale (α=.75).

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations are in Table 5, and regression results are in Table 6.

[Insert Tables 5-6 here]

The correlation between the anger scale and collective action intentions was significant and positive (r = .34, p<.001). We then used regression (Model 1) and ran an additional model that included the control variables used in the previous survey studies (Model 2). These results showed that the angrier outsider activists were about the issue, the more likely they were to advocate for it in the future, even when controlling for past actions and demographics (Model 2: B= .12 , SE=.04, p=.002).

Importantly, this study provided evidence of the positive relationship between outsiders’ anger about a social movement and their collective action intentions across a large number of activists and in contemporary social movements.

STUDY 3

We sought an additional sample of institutional insiders in a contemporary social movement order to examine our proposed mechanism, fear of negative consequences for acting. Therefore, we recruited participants through Net Impact, an organization whose members are comprised of self-identified agents of social change within business, and “empowers a new generation to use their careers to drive transformational change in the workplace and the world” (see www.netimpact.org). Individuals pay to join Net Impact, and therefore have already shown a commitment to be an institutional insider. This study allowed us to explore the association between anger and the collective action intentions of institutional insiders – and the potential
mechanism that accounts for this association. We also later pre-registered and replicated this study with a new sample of Net Impact members ($N=100$), with materials and details available in our OSF folder for this project and discussed briefly below.

**Method**

**Participants.** We invited members of Net Impact who were employed on a full-time basis in various organizations to participate in the study. We advertised our study by including a link in an e-mail newsletter message sent to members of Net Impact with a valid email address.

The message invited members to participate in a twenty-minute online survey aimed at understanding the factors that facilitate having influence and creating social change at work in exchange for $10$ Amazon gift card, some or all of it which could be donated to Net Impact. We kept the survey open for three weeks and sent two reminder emails.

We screened our sample based on the a priori decision to include only those who were currently employed in an organization, and also removed those who participated twice from analyses, resulting in a final sample of $N=238-294$ due to missing data. We assessed the degree of similarity between our sample and the entire professional membership of Net Impact using their annual survey ($N=1,964$); however, this comparison is imperfect because it contained both professionals (our sample) and students (the majority of their membership) and was not broken down by membership. Our sample had slightly greater percentage of women ($61.9$ percent in our sample compared with $57$ percent in the organization], and as expected was slightly older than the Net Impact average ($35.34$ versus $29$ years). The percentage of individuals with at least a Bachelor-level education was higher in our data ($98.7$ percent in our sample compared with $91$ percent in Net Impact]. Among those in our sample who answered these questions, the makeup

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7 In exchange for this advertising, we paid Net Impact $5,000.
was similar to Net Impact’s membership in terms of distribution of race (70/71% White, 3.3/5% Black, 26.7/23% other in our sample/Net Impact, respectively). Participants had an average of 10.81 years of full time work experience (SD = 8.87, range = 0 to 43 years) and came from a wide range of industries; these data were not available for comparison.

Procedure

Participants were presented with the same definition of a social issue used in Study 2, and were asked to take a few minutes to think about a social issue important to them and relevant for their organization, and that they have felt strongly about within the past three months (to help alleviate retrospective memory limitations; Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Bradburn, 1990; Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz, 1996). Once they had identified and thought about a particular social issue, we asked them to describe it. The majority of participants described environmental sustainability, but other themes included workers’ rights, health, poverty, and diversity. After writing about their chosen issue, participants rated its importance. Next, they completed a measure for anger about the social issue, and fear of negative consequences for taking action.

In the next section, we asked participants to describe any actions that they had taken in the previous three months to help address their selected social issue. Participants responded to several additional measures and demographics, chose their compensation, and were thanked and debriefed.

Measures

Anger. Participants reported the degree to which they felt angry when thinking about the social issue that they identified (using the same 5-items as the previous studies) on a Likert scale of 0 (not at all) to 8 (extremely/a great deal) ($\alpha = .92$).
**Mechanism: Fear of negative consequences.** We measured participants’ fear of negative consequences (i.e., possible social costs and career costs) of advocating for their chosen social issue at work with a 13-item measure based on Ashford’s (1986) image risk measure. We supplemented the original four items by randomly containing them within a larger list of nine other potential consequences of advocating for social change at work (e.g., being seen as foolish by one’s boss, and being fired or demoted for speaking out). All items loaded highly (> .70) onto a single factor in a maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblimin rotation. We averaged the items into a single fear of negative consequences scale (α = .96).

**Collective action intentions.** Following the protocol adapted from Sonenshein 2006, we measured insiders’ collective action intentions using a seven-point scale (from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely likely), asking participants: “how likely are you to approach your boss to discuss the social issue that you identified for this survey?” We supplemented this with three additional items similar to Study 2, asking participants to rate how likely they would be to approach their boss to advocate for any issue in the future, to advocate for this social issue at work, and to advocate for any social issue at work in the future. These items formed a reliable scale (α = .89).

**Control variables**

**Past collective action.** Like the previous studies, the cross-sectional nature of this study lent itself to possible third variables (Bono and McNamara, 2011). In particular, we were concerned that participants’ previous actions to support the social issue at work might relate to both their current anger about the issue, as previous frustrations trying to support a social issue at work could make activists angrier. Previous actions to support the issue could also relate to the likelihood of future actions, since past actions are highly predictive of future ones. Therefore, participants rated the same two items as the previous study adapted for the workplace, on a seven
point scale estimating how much effort they had put into advocating for social issues at work in the past three months. We added a third item for the organizational sample: How much have you acted to support all social issues in your organization over the past year? We averaged all three items into a scale ($\alpha = .76$). Like the previous survey studies, we included the same demographic covariates to examine how these related to collective action intentions and whether the influence of anger held beyond their inclusion.

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics and correlations are in Table 7, and regression results are in Table 8.

Examining the correlations in Table 7 and the regression in Table 8 (Model 1), we see that anger is negatively but not significantly related to collective action intentions. As can be seen in Table 8, in a regression that accounts for third variables and demographics, we see that angrier participants reported marginally lower action intentions than less angry participants (Model 3: $B = -.07, SE = .04, p = .053$). This result could be due to how past action acts as a suppressor of the negative relationship between anger and action intention, since those who have acted previously are both significantly angrier and more likely to act in the future.

Mediation analyses

Examining the mediator, we find that anger is significantly positively predictive of fear of negative consequences (Model 5: $B = .20, SE = .03, p < .001$), and that fear of negative consequences is negatively related to future action intentions (Model 2: $B = -.55, SE = .07, p < .001$). Each of these relationships hold when including the full model. The marginal relationship between anger and future action intentions (Model 3) is no longer significant when including fear of negative consequences in the regression (Model 4), supportive of mediation (Baron and
Kenny, 1986). Notably, when including the measure of fear in the equation, we do not find that the effect of anger becomes positive and significant, as suggested by Miller et al. (2009). That is, we do not find evidence that fear acts as a suppressor of a positive relationship between anger and collective action intention.

We then estimated the indirect effect between anger and collective action intentions via fear of negative consequences using the Hayes (2013) bootstrapping macro (N=10,000; Model 4), which showed a significant indirect effect of anger on collective action intentions operating through fear of negative consequences: \( B = -.12, SE = .03; 95\% \ CI [-.17, -.07] \). This result remained significant with the inclusion of covariates.

We explored whether there was an interaction between anger and fear of negative consequences predicting collective action intentions, but we did not find support for such a relationship. It could be that because our sample is rather young and therefore, likely not at the highest levels in organizations where they could be insusceptible to reputational and career concerns, which could offset the negative effects of anger. Second, we explored how the results may have varied by different actions by separating the dependent variable scale into scales that contained the two items about general advocacy (e.g., likelihood of advocating for the social issue at work) versus those that specifically were about approaching the boss, retaining covariates in the model. This analysis showed that while anger related negatively but not significantly to collective action intentions for general advocacy \( (B = -.04, SE = .04, p = .29) \), it was significantly negatively related to advocating for social issues to one’s boss \( (B = -.11, SE = .04, p = .018) \). Notably, the negative indirect effect of anger on collective action intentions via fear of negative consequences was significant for all operationalizations of the dependent variable. That is, fear explained the lower motivation to approach authorities as well as a lower
motivation to participate in other forms of advocacy. However, it was significantly stronger for actions involving approaching organizational authorities. Furthermore, even null effects of anger on action intentions are theoretically consistent with a withdrawal rather than an approach response initiated by anger. The fact that the effect is stronger for authority-targeting actions is also theoretically consistent with reinforcement sensitivity because authorities are riskier to approach due to their power to administer reprisals. However, we note that this study shows only partial support of our hypotheses, due to a lack of a significant direct negative relationship between anger and collective action intentions.

It is also possible that institutional insiders, relative to outsiders, are less likely to feel that they have a mobilized referent group, which could influence the dynamics of emotion and motivation. Therefore, we explored whether having coworkers who also advocated for social issues at work may have buffered the negative effect of anger on insiders’ action intentions. Insiders reported to what extent (from 1= not at all to 7= very much) they had coworkers who also advocated for social issues at their organization ($M = 4.32\ SD=2.01$). We found that, while a stronger presence of likeminded coworkers was associated with insiders’ greater action intentions ($B=.43, SE = .04, p < .001$), this effect was independent of anger.

Notably, we conducted a pre-registered replication of this study, details of which can be found in the OSF folder for this project. In that study, we again found partial support for the hypotheses, such that anger among institutional insiders was negatively but not significantly directly related to their collective action intentions, and that anger indirectly was related to lower action intentions via its positive association with fear of negative consequences.

This study builds on the previous ones by examining a sample of real institutional insiders who are members of a strongly identified association of individuals devoted to social
change in business. It also includes a measure for the theorized mechanism: fear of negative consequences. Despite the collective strength of Studies 1-3, all three were cross-sectional and therefore cannot fully eliminate reverse causality, selection, or third variable concerns. To account for these possibilities, we turn to an experiment for the final study.

**STUDY 4**

We conducted an experiment to deductively test our hypotheses and to rule out the possible alternative explanation that insiders’ and outsiders’ self-selection into those positions could explain their different emotional dynamics and collective action intentions. Consistent with the field’s movement towards greater transparency, we noted our hypotheses and exclusion rules before conducting the study, and include materials and de-identified data for this experiment. This study, as well as additional pilot studies and preregistered partial replications of this study, also appear in the OSF folder. We also briefly discuss these below.

**Participants and Design**

We purchased a panel of respondents from Qualtrics who were employed full-time (outside of online survey work) and who cared about social issues relevant to organizations. We invited qualified participants to complete a study and used a protocol consistent with our previous studies. Participants first completed demographics and screener measures. They viewed a definition of a social issue and responded to questions about how much they cared about social issues. Consistent with the insiders in previous studies, we decided a priori that we would include only those participants who were currently working in an organization other than online survey work, and who cared about social issues in organizations. Participants completed two items adapted from the screener items from our previous studies: “to what extent do you care about social issues in organizations?” and “to what extent do you want organizations to become
more socially responsible?" Identical to our previous selection criteria, we selected participants who scored at or above the midpoint on each item in this scale (4). Using current standards for experimental work, we targeted a sample of approximately 100 individuals per cell in the experimental design who met our criteria (400) and successfully recruited 419 individuals (60.6% women; \( M_{\text{age}} = 37.2 \) years). Participants came from a wide range of industries and job titles, averaged 15.97 years of full time work experience, and 79.9 percent reported having at least a college education. For income, the majority of the sample reported earning at least $35,000 annually (84.7%). The sample was 75.9 percent white, 8.6 percent Black, 5.7 percent Asian, 3.6 percent Latinx and the remainder was “other.” In terms of political affiliation, 43.8 percent of participants reported affiliation with the Democratic Party and 36 percent with the Republican Party. Because we measured demographics in the day prior to the experiment, we did not ask about SMO membership in order to avoid biasing participants.

Next, the software randomly assigned participants to the perspective of institutional insider (\( N=217 \)) or outsider (\( N=202 \)). We asked all participants to take a few minutes to think about and then select a social issue that is important to them from a list (developed from participants’ answers in piloting and the previous studies). Those in the insider condition were told that this should be an issue relevant for their work (other than online survey work). Those in the outsider condition were asked to select an issue that is relevant for business/organizations. Participants then selected from a list of social issues. The most frequently selected category was the natural environment/sustainability (25.7%), followed by health (23.5%), workplace diversity (21.6%), poverty (19.6%), and workers’ rights (9.6%). Those in the outsider condition were asked to write the name of a specific organization where the social issue they selected is important, excluding their current place of employment. Those in the insider condition were
asked to optionally write the name of the organization in which they work where this social issue was important.

We adopted strategies from past research to examine induced anger (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff, 2003), and the software next randomly assigned participants to either describe what makes them the most angry about the social issue ($N = 219$) or to describe what affects them the most about the issue, objectively and dispassionately ($N = 200$). Insiders were asked relative to their workplace, and outsiders were asked relative to the organization that they named above (i.e., not their workplace).

In the following section, consistent with prior work (Sonenshein, 2006), we asked those in the institutional insider condition to write a letter to their manager about their previously chosen social issue and to outline a specific and realistic strategy to help address the social issue at their organization. Those in the outsider condition completed the identical task, which was phrased as writing a letter to “a manager” at the organization that they named (not their workplace). We selected this letter writing task because is recognized by social movement scholars as a common collective action tactic for outsiders (see Eesley, DeCelles and Lenox, 2016; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; Minkoff, 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004), and it was also apparent from open-ended responses in Study 3 that institutional insiders used written communications as a tactic. We also note that employees of Wayfair recently used a letter as an insider collective action to try to influence the company’s involvement with U.S. border security (see Trafecante and Meyersohn, 2019). However, because our field studies cannot fully rule out the alternative explanation that institutional insiders and outsiders simply use different tactics, we believed it was important to use the same tactic for both as the dependent variable in the controlled experiment. However, it might be awkward for insiders who often rely on face-to-face
communication with their coworkers and superiors to influence change. In addition, while our Study 3 Net Impact participants reported acting as individuals and collaborating in groups, as well as advocating to authorities, it could be that institutional insiders do not act as individuals, but only as collectives, and that they do not directly approach authorities, presenting potential challenges to the external validity of this task. Or, it could be that participants in the study assumed that they were acting as a collective in the letter writing task when in the outsider condition. We ruled out these possible threats to experimental validity with a pilot experiment, reported in our online supplemental materials.

After writing their letter, we asked all participants to indicate their collective action intentions (i.e., likelihood of sending a letter like the one that they wrote above, either to their boss or to a manager at the organization, depending on condition). Next, participants indicated the riskiness of reputational damage for advocating for the issue using a single item from Ashford’s (1986) image risk measure. We used a single item to reduce participant fatigue, and to use a measure that was general, rather than specific to the workplace context, so that it would be comparable for both insider and outsider perspective assignments. We asked, “In deciding about whether or not to send the letter above, one factor that you might consider is whether doing so might harm your reputation. How risky (in terms of potential harm to your reputation) would it be for you to send the letter above?” Participants indicated how risky they thought it was (from 1=not at all risky to 7=extremely risky).

Finally, participants completed an emotion manipulation check using the same anger measure as in previous studies on a seven point Likert scale, and demographics.

**Results and Discussion**

Means by condition and univariate results are included in Tables 9-10.
An ANOVA showed that the experimental manipulation of anger (versus no emotion) significantly affected participants’ anger on the manipulation check ($M= 4.29$, $SD= 2.49$ in the anger condition versus $M= 3.42$, $SD= 2.27$ in the control condition), $F= 13.84$, $p< .001$.

Examining the main effects, ANOVAs showed that participants in the anger condition were not significantly different from those than the control condition in their collective action intentions ($M= 4.11$, $SD= 2.03$ in the anger condition versus $M= 4.01$, $SD= 2.05$ in the control condition, $F= .27$, $p= .601$). Similarly, participants in the different activist conditions did not significantly differ in their overall collective action intentions in the outsider condition ($M= 4.12$, $SD= 1.97$) versus in the insider condition ($M= 4.01$, $SD= 2.09$; $F= .28$, $p= .598$).

We next tested our main hypothesis – that the effect of anger on collective action intentions was moderated by structural location, such that it was positive for outsiders but negative for insiders. We found partial support for this hypothesis, such that the effect of anger on collective action intentions was conditional upon being an institutional insider or outsider; the interaction between the structural location and anger conditions was marginally significant on collective action intentions ($F=3.74$, $p=.054$). Exploring the means for the interaction by condition (plotted in Figure 1), we see that the relationship between anger and collective action intentions was positive and marginal for outsiders ($t= 1.75$, $p = .081$), and negative but not significant for insiders ($t= - .973$, $p = .331$).

Next, we tested the remaining paths of our proposed mediation hypothesis. Those in the insider ($M= 4.01$, $SD=2.03$) versus outsider role ($M= 3.40$, $SD=1.94$) differed significantly on fear of negative consequences ($F= 9.99$, $p=.002$), as did those in the anger ($M=3.96$, $SD=2.05$)
versus control ($M=3.44, SD = 1.93$) emotion condition ($F=7.23, p=.007$). However, we did not find a significant interaction between structural location and anger predicting fear of negative consequences ($F=.05, p=.828$). That is, both institutional insiders and outsiders who were angry reported significantly greater fear of reputational damage than those who were in the control condition. This result could be because the measure of fear of negative consequences in this study was general reputation, rather than workplace-based (a decision we made so that participants in each condition could make sense of the measure).

We next tested mediation using Hayes (2013) PROCESS bootstrapping macro to examine the indirect effect of anger on collective action intentions through fear of negative consequences. We first examined Model 7, which tests whether the path from anger to fear is moderated by whether someone was an institutional insider or outsider ($N=10,000$). We did not find support for this model, because both groups who were angry were more fearful of negative consequences relative to the control condition. Given that in this study we measured general reputational consequences rather than work-specific consequences, it could be that considering engaging in collective action might be seen as risky for outsiders’ reputations with their friends, family, or community groups. Therefore hypothesis 2 was not supported. We next explored an alternative model, Model 14 ($N=10,000$), which tested whether the path from fear to collective action intentions was moderated by structural location. Here, we found that greater fear among those who were angry about the social movement issue differentially affected collective action intentions, depending on structural location (interaction $B=.48, SE=.10, t=4.93, p<.0001$). That is, for institutional insiders, fear resulting from anger was associated with a significantly lower likelihood of acting ($B= -.17, SE=.07, t=-2.54, p=.012$). However, for outsiders, fear resulting from anger was associated with greater collective action intentions ($B=.32, SE=.07, t=4.33,$
This model showed significant indirect effects for both structural locations, as well as a significant moderated mediation effect (Index=.25, Boot SE=.11, 95% CI [.06, .50]). While we did not anticipate this form of the interaction a priori, this result is consistent with the fight-flight-freeze system from reinforcement sensitivity theory, which posits that when individuals face a potential threat, they consider whether or not they would be able to overcome the potential threat (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). If one assesses that the threat is conquerable, individuals engage in a “fight” response, whereas if it is not seen as conquerable, individuals engage in a “flight” or approach response. It is also consistent with some social movement scholars’ positioning of fear as a potential mobilizing emotion (e.g., Britt and Heise, 2000). However, it is worth noting that these effects are experimental in nature, are simulations, and are bounded by the task and measures used.

We again investigated whether the effect of anger on collective action intentions was moderated rather than mediated by fear of negative consequences, but we did not find a significant interaction. Additionally, at the request of a reviewer we examined if differences in the source of anger (such as anger about the issue, at specific people, at politicians or government, at the organization, about a lack of responsiveness, about retaliation, at one’s managers, at the media, or one’s self) using two study-blind, independent research assistants code the sources of anger from participants’ essays. We found that outsiders and insiders did not significantly differ in these anger sources, except for anger at government/politicians ($F = 5.22, p =.023$), where outsiders were more often angry at these parties than insiders. Including this source of anger in the model indicated that the marginal interaction of structural location and emotion conditions now reached conventional significance ($F=3.89, p=.049$).
Finally, we ran large, pre-registered partial replications of this study (available in our online supplement), which showed results consistent with this study: anger does not cause greater collective intentions among insiders, and this is explained with an indirect negative effect for insiders on their collective action intention mediated by fear of negative consequences.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

We conducted a multi-method investigation into the emotional asymmetries of institutional insiders and outsiders’ social movement mobilization. In particular, we examined whether the motivational effect of anger about a social movement on outsiders’ collective action intentions unraveled or even reversed for institutional insiders. Across both field and experimental methods, we find evidence questioning the mobilization potential of social movement anger for institutional insiders, compared to outsiders. While scholars and social movement activists alike recognize that anger can be an important motivator of collective action (Collins, 1990; Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001; Aminzade and McAdam, 2002; Emibayer and Goldberg, 2005), we find that anger is not effective in mobilizing institutional insiders, precisely because it fosters fear, which is associated with a lower intention to act. Although employees are a potentially powerful source of social change (Davis and White 2015), institutional insiders have valued relationships, reputations, and jobs tied to the target of that change which are vulnerable (Meyerson and Scully, 1995, Ashford, 1986). We theorize that institutional insiders have goal conflicts that outsiders do not: wanting to do something about an injustice by an organization, but simultaneously facing serious career risks for doing so (Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Meyerson, 2001). Being angry, then, paradoxically increases institutional insiders’ fear, rather than catalyzing action in the face of it, which in turn reduces the motivation to act.
Consistently across studies, we differences between outsiders and institutional insiders in their emotion-mobilization dynamics, suggesting that anger frames often invoked in social movements could potentially cause some unanticipated consequences. That is, for those positioned to be able to make change from inside organizations and influence them to be more progressive, anger about social movements could result in action-freezing fear. Therefore, when targeting institutional insiders, social movement groups need to take this into account and use a frame that does not intentionally provoke anger.

Consequently, consideration of the unique psychological motivational processes of institutional insiders also alters the way that social scientists understand how anger and fear shape activist mobilization and ultimately social movement success. By focusing on the emotional asymmetries of institutional insiders and outsiders, we develop a theoretical explanation about what their unique emotional experiences are (Meyerson, 2001), as well as why these unique emotional experiences matter for social movement mobilization. Therefore, we contribute to an emerging theoretical understanding about the critical differences between traditional activists outside organizations and insiders who are employed within and may become potential activist allies (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016).

Our work extends previous research on social movements in organizations in several ways. First, we present greater theoretical integration within the interdisciplinary literature in collective action, building bridges between the psychological, organizational, and structural perspectives to understand better why people engage in collective action (Klandermans, 1997). We do so by integrating the organizational and sociological scholarship on social movements with psychological theory and methodologies to uncover a key but overlooked element critical for emotional mobilization for collective action – how the structural location of the sympathetic
individual as institutional insiders or outsiders shapes their emotion and mobilization. If movements attempt to encourage participation in collective action through emotional frames, why does the experience of emotion not have the same effect on everyone? An account of the structural location of the individual helps address this puzzle (Collins, 1990) and underlines the importance of considering psychological mechanisms. Our work therefore advances explanations for why it is possible that the same emotional experience within the same social movement can have an encouraging effect in one sympathetic individual even while it potentially drives another away from acting. For example, research has found that individuals mobilizing mutinies against a colonialist power might be empowered by righteous anger (Rao and Dutta, 2012), whereas British sympathizers to the mutinies might be overly-cautious and fearful. Jasper (2011: 826) recognized this possibility, writing “scholars of emotions in movements often concentrate on emotions that help protestors rather than on a full range that help, hurt, or do neither.” Difference in structural location is therefore an important contingency for how sympathetic individuals respond to emotional stimuli in the course of social movements targeting organizations.

Second, we deepen our understanding of the relationship between two common social movement emotions (anger and fear), which can influence individuals’ mobilization in opposite ways from one another, and in ways that depart from previous findings on either emotion alone. Past research on fear, for example, has acknowledged that it can deter institutional insiders’ action (e.g., Ashford, 1986) and make activists leery of collective action (Britt and Heise, 2000; Goodwin et al., 2001; Neubert, 1998). However, we depart from previous treatment of fear in social movements by theorizing it as an outcome of social movement anger, instead of something that anger can potentially overcome or effectively channel (Britt and Heise, 2000), or as simply a co-occurring suppressor of a positive relationship between anger and collective action (Miller et
al., 2009). Therefore, our paper acknowledges variance in the effects that different emotions, and the relationship between them, can have on shaping the mobilization process (Jasper, 2011).

In developing our theory about the dynamics of anger and fear in social movement mobilization, we also respond to criticisms of research on emotions in social movements (see, for example, Jasper, 2011), including examining how emotions in social movements can be rational (rather than irrational). In our theory, fear of negative consequences is arguably consistent with rational decision making, weighing costs and benefits of acting, and as such, could be considered an adaptive response for employees to avoid potential harm. Thus, we illustrate how emotions and rationality can be complementary. Notably, while the resource mobilization perspective (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977) implies that anger may not be sufficient to motivate collective action, we reconcile this perspective with extant research on mobilizing emotions. That is, anger’s effect on mobilization appears to be conditional upon an individual’s structural location – that is, not nested within an organizational target of the movement.

Our approach also makes a contribution to the literature on social movements and organizations by revisiting work of individual level explanations and experimental approaches that were once more common (e.g., Martin et al. 1984; Martin, 1986). We extend this past work, which demonstrated that employees’ sense of injustice might not translate into collective action intentions by introducing reinforcement sensitivity theory as an explanation. That is, we theorize that institutional insiders’ fear of negative consequences, triggered by their anger, serves as a mechanism explaining why anger may sometimes be ineffective in mobilizing change. We also integrate this earlier work with more contemporary approaches for understanding how individuals inside organizations try to push for social movement issues (e.g., Sonenshein, 2006, 2014; Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al., 1997a, 1997b; Meyerson, 2001). We do so by
building our theory from psychological scholarship on motivation, including both reinforcement sensitivity theory and appraisal theory. In doing so, we demonstrate how, by integrating micro explanations with macro considerations (such as structural location and social movements), we can better understand both individual level and structural effects on mobilization.

Our empirical approach also harkens earlier work on individuals’ motivation for collective action at work (Martin et al., 1984, Martin, 1986). In doing so, we are able to use methodological triangulation that provides both external validity and tests for causality. The experimental study, while arguably limited in external validity due to being a scenario rather than real life and focused only on a single tactic, are meant to be psychologically engaging and realistic for participants who were people passionate about social movement issues. Experiments are also critical methodologically for several reasons. First, experimental approaches use randomization and therefore, remove alternative explanations and third variable problems that might exist in field data. Therefore, things like prior level of collective action, pre-existing anger and fear about social movements and organizations, different forms of social movement anger, different types of jobs and coworker dynamics, and failed past experiences with advocating for change at work, are all held constant. Second, the experiment helps to establish causal direction; while the reverse effect may also be true – that institutional insiders who are not motivated to act have more fear and anger, the experiments can test the theorized causal direction.

**Future directions**

Social movement scholars have posited that having insider allies is a key ingredient to movement mobilization and successful movement outcomes, and yet, these same scholars note the challenges of mobilizing them (Kellogg, 2009; McDonnell, King and Soule, 2015; Scully and Segal, 2002). Our study sheds some light on this problem, suggesting that paradoxically, less
angry institutional insiders might be more likely to engage in collective action. Our analysis demonstrates that many of the collective action frames that movements harness to mobilize action (i.e., those that trigger anger about a cause) may be ineffective or even counterproductive to building support among the insiders of institutions they seek to change. Future research that examines institutional insiders might consider looking at alternative mobilizing emotions. For example, it could be that the positive emotion of hope regarding an institution’s capacity to change, compassion for victims, or even pride in one’s organization, might more effectively mobilize institutional insiders than would anger. Shame, an emotion that has the promise to both reinforce current institutional prescriptions as well as trigger disruption (Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, and Smith –Crowe, 2014), could also be an interesting emotion to examine as it relates to the potential emotional asymmetry of insiders as compared with outsiders (Britt and Heise, 2000).

Typically, structural perspectives rely on rational calculations as theoretical mechanisms to derive individual actions. Building on these perspectives, our study suggests that structural location is also highly interconnected with emotion, which influences individuals’ assessments of the advantages of engaging in collective action (McAdam, 1986; Klandermans, 1984; Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). A sociological perspective on emotions and movement mobilization should consider how both structural location and discrete emotions combine to produce what may seem to the potential participant as a rational inducement for action. Our work suggests that understanding the interplay of structural location and responses to discrete emotion—like anger at a social movement target— is a promising avenue for identifying “the mechanisms that transpose these emotions into some sort of action” (Berezin, 2002: 37).
It would also be helpful for scholars to examine how institutional insiders might be able to shift tactics, or otherwise somehow effectively cope with the fear of potential costs of advocating for issues in their organizations. Sonenshein (2016) for example theorizes that when issues are riskier for institutional insiders, they might take advantage of ambiguity in the issue to reshape its meaning in ways not harmful to their career. Our studies cannot fully rule out the possibility that insiders, when angry, might adopt even more subtle tactics that we did not explicitly measure in our studies. For instance, perhaps when angry, institutional insiders do more research on the issue on their own time, a tactic that could be invisible to others and therefore, avoid potential career consequences. It might not be that such subtle actions can be considered collective action intentions if they do not materialize into a desire to try to influence the organization itself. The indirect effect which we consistently find across the studies for insiders also suggests that there could be competing mechanisms that have a positive relationship with both anger and action intention. The results suggest that fear of negative consequences effectively cancels out this motivational mechanism of anger, and future would could identify more precisely these competing motivational mechanisms that help to better specify the complex relationship between anger and action intention for insiders.

Future research should also examine potential moderators of the effects that we see. For instance, our studies did not have top management members, whose institutional authority might lead them to care little about reputational consequences of advocating for a social issue at work. Therefore, looking at the influence of anger among elites (Chatterji and Toffel, 2018) and more powerful members of the organizational hierarchy (Kellogg, 2009) is an important direction for future work. Relatedly, future work might also examine how our results pertain to other stakeholder groups, including specific roles within the organization (Wright, Nyberg and Grant,
2012), and consumers and community members that activist groups seek to mobilize (King, 2008; Eesley, et al., 2016). Continuing to theorize differences and similarities across stakeholder groups in social movement sentiment pools could help to advance an overarching theory of top down (structural) and bottom up (individual, emotional) processes of mobilization. Further, we explored the possibility of threshold effects of anger in our studies, but we did not find any support for a curvilinear relationship between anger and action intentions for institutional insiders. However, there could be threshold effects that occur in contexts that our studies did not examine, such as more extreme situations that generate stronger emotions.

Our work examines an individual psychological motivational process. However, scholars have also pointed to the importance of networks and similar others in mobilizing sympathizers into activists (McAdam, 1986; Ohlemacher, 1996), as well as other more macro considerations. In our studies, we find small effects, and while these are consistent with the effect sizes typically seen in psychological and experimental research, this suggests that there is still substantial variance left to explain in institutional insiders’ emotions and collective action intentions. For instance, it is likely that group-level and other more macro processes also influence emotion and collective action among institutional insiders, and potentially in novel ways relative to outsiders. For example, it could be that insiders are less likely to have a collective or a group of likeminded coworkers who have mobilized, presenting additional challenges to their motivation. Furthermore, it could be that only having close ties can mitigate the negative impact of anger. It could also be that organizational factors function as micro-mobilizing contexts that moderate whether or not groups can attenuate the negative influence of anger for mobilization (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988).
Finally, our research examined collective action intentions and not actual collective action behavior. We examined intentions consistent with the motivational perspective in our theory, which is future-oriented. Examining collective action emotion and behavior as it unfolds in the field would likely be quite challenging (Webb and Sheeran, 2006), and if not conducted live, could be subject to post-hoc rationalizations. However, while a focus on collective action intentions has a longstanding tradition in the literature (Martin et al. 1984; Martin, 1986), and evidence demonstrates that they often relate to real behavior (De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009, cf. Tausch, et al., 2011), we do not have data on actual behaviors. Therefore, the results of our studies should be interpreted as such, and future work should examine how our model might replicate with collective action behavior.

Activists, often angry about an issue, are increasingly demanding change from companies (Davis and White, 2015). Employees appear similarly angry about social movement issues in their workplaces, such as inequality (Kottasova, 2018) and sexual harassment (Grinberg, Ravitz, and Zdanowicz, 2017). And yet, despite their anger about injustices, employees are often hesitant to take collective action (Meyerson, 2001; Meyerson and Scully, 1995). Even as organizations become more progressive and open to social movements (Campbell, 2007; Turban and Greening, 1997; Vasi and King, 2012), examples of employees’ collective action in their organizations are surprisingly rare (see also Martin, 1986, Martin et al., 1984). We explain that employees’ anger might not effectively translate into collective action because it creates a fear that the risks of collective action are too great. While institutional insiders are uniquely knowledgeable and positioned to bring about social movement changes to institutions (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), their emotional dynamics may thwart their motivation to effect change.
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Zurcher, L. A. and D. A. Snow
Table 1. Outsider- Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – OWS Study 1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Collective action intentions (count)</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anger</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Past collective actions (count)</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td>4. Education (9 point scale)</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Income (in thousands)</td>
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<td>59.14</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6. Gender (1= male)</td>
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<td>.48</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<td>7. Ethnicity (1= white)</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>8. Democrat (1)</td>
<td>.20</td>
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<td>159</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Age</td>
<td>29.88</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SMO member (1)</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 No Republicans were in this sample.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$
Table 2. Outsider OLS Regression Model Predicting Collective Action Intentions – OWS Study 1

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.33 (.27)</td>
<td>1.13 (.61) ±</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.06 (.10)</td>
<td>.18 (.11)</td>
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<td>Past collective actions (count)</td>
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<td>Education (9 point scale)</td>
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<td>Democrat (=1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO member (=1)</td>
<td>.30 (.26)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Model $R^2$</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table indicates unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.
Model 1 N = 152, Model 2 N=106 due to missing data.
± $p < .10$
Table 3. Institutional Insider Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – OWS Study 1

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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* p ≤ .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
### Table 4. Insider OLS Regression Model Predicting Collective Action Intentions– OWS Study 1

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<tr>
<td>Income (in thousands)</td>
<td>.00 (.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (1=male)</td>
<td>-.17 (.22)</td>
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<td>Ethnicity (1=white)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Republican (=1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.06 (.34)</td>
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Table indicates unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.

Model 1 N = 81, Model 2 N=45 due to missing data.

± $p < .10$

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations, Study 2 (Outsider Survey Study)

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* p ≤ .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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N=245 in both models. Table indicates unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$
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*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Table 8: Regression Results, Study 3 (Net Impact Insider Survey Study)

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<th>DV: Fear of Negative Consequences</th>
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<td>-.07 (.04) ±</td>
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N=229-268 due to missing data. Table indicates unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.

± $p < .10$

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$
Table 9. Means and Standard Deviation by Condition, Experimental Study 4

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Table 10. Univariate results predicting collective action intention, Experimental Study 4

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Interaction partial $\eta^2 = .01$

a. MS(Outsider X Anger)
b. MS(Error)
Figure 1. Collective action intentions, means and standard errors by experimental condition (Study 4)